We provide evidence that commercial lenders in Peru free ride off their peer's screening efforts. Leveraging a discontinuity in the loan approval process of a large bank, we find competing lenders responded to additional loan approvals by issuing approvals of their own. Competing lenders captured almost three quarters of the new loans to previously financially excluded borrowers. Importantly, many of these borrowers never took a loan from our partner bank, even after our partner bank approved them. Lenders may therefore underinvest in screening new borrowers and expanding financial inclusion, as their competitors reap some of the benefit. Our results highlight that information spillovers between lenders may operate outside of credit registries.
consideration is typically framed based on whether a borrower will eventually join a competing lender after the initial lender has incurred the cost of establishing her reliability (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995) , but in principle this form of competition could occur even before the first loan is issued. If lenders are more likely to approve borrowers already approved by their competitors, then lenders that incur the cost of evaluating new or underserved borrowers may not reap the resulting benefits. This phenomenon whereby lenders free ride on the screening efforts of their competitors reduces the incentive to expand credit access and financial inclusion and might warrant policy intervention.
We demonstrate that free riding in loan approvals has a large impact on market outcomes. Specifically, we worked with a large Peruvian bank interested in expanding credit access to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Our partner bank adopted a new screening technology and determined which SMEs to lend to based on a scoring rule with a strict threshold. Borrowers above the threshold were automatically granted a loan whereas borrowers below the threshold were offered a loan only if a loan officer deemed it appropriate. Borrowers above the threshold also received more attractive loan terms.
Exploiting this threshold along with administrative data from our partner bank and credit registry data from Equifax Peru, we document several findings.
While applicants without prior credit histories who score above the threshold were more likely to receive a loan than those who score below it, three quarters of the additional loans were issued by competing financial institutions rather than from our partner bank.
Importantly, most of these borrowers never took even a single loan from our partner bank.
Because the only differences between borrowers on either side of the threshold are whether they were approved for a loan from our partner bank and the resulting loan terms, this is evidence of free riding in loan approvals. We document that free riding in loan approvals is concentrated amongst non-bank financial institutions and is higher in regions of Peru in which our partner bank faces more competition. Furthermore, we find evidence that our partner bank's loan approvals for these marginal borrowers lead to an increase in the profits of competing financial institutions but not our partner bank.
In contrast, we find that among applicants with a prior credit history, nearly all additional borrowing for those above the threshold does come from loans issued by our partner bank. That is, we do not find evidence of free riding in loan approvals for these applicants. Importantly, applicants with credit histories who receive loans only because they are just above the threshold are those whose credit histories otherwise establish them to be unsuitable borrowers. So, the stamp of approval from our partner bank may have carried less weight in competitors' approval processes as they had other signals of credit (un)worthiness to rely on.
Taken together these findings paint a stark picture. Though our partner bank incurred the costs of the novel screening technology, the benefits accrued largely to its competitors. The straightforward implication is that banks may underinvest in expanding the credit supply to underserved borrowers, as doing so entails a private cost but produces a public good. This may justify subsidies to private sector efforts to expand financial inclusion.
Several mechanisms may underlie this phenomenon of free riding in loan approvals. On the supply-side, lenders may directly respond to the loan approvals of our partner bank by issuing loan approvals of their own. For instance, borrowers may have shared their loan approval documents with competing lenders, who then updated about the credit worthiness of these borrowers. On the demand-side, borrowers who received a loan approval from our partner bank may have updated their beliefs about their own credit worthiness and redoubled their search for credit from competing lenders. This channel is consistent with Karlan and Zinman (2009) who find that South African consumer loan applicants randomly approved for credit update positively about their self-perceived likelihood to be approved for loans from other lenders. In the case of demand-side mechanisms, other lenders benefit from the loan approvals of our partner bank through the indirect channel of receiving more applicants, rather than by directly responding to the loan approvals themselves.
Importantly, we can rule out some potential mechanisms. On the supply-side we can exclude any mechanism that operates through the credit registry, as our findings are based on loan approvals rather than loan issuances, and loan approvals are not recorded in the Peruvian credit registry. On the demand-side we can rule out complementarities in borrowing whereby an initial loan from our partner bank increases demand for credit from other lenders; few of the borrowers in our sample who received loans from competing lenders first borrowed from our partner bank.
Though we cannot pin down a single explanation, we argue that the precise mechanism by which this free riding occurs does not influence our broad conclusions; so long as a loan approval by our partner bank causes (directly or indirectly) other lenders to approve the same borrowers, the private returns of identifying credit worthy borrowers and expanding the financial supply will diverge from the corresponding social returns.
Our paper relates to several literatures. First, we complement the literature examining how variation in the credit supply decisions of one lender influences the credit supply of competitors (Agarwal et al. 2018 , Castellanos et al. 2018 , Karlan and Zinman 2018 , Azevedo et al. 2019 , Burke et al. 2019 . Through variation in loan terms or access to credit, each of these papers finds evidence that an initial loan from one lender causes other lenders to provide access to credit as well. Our paper is distinct in this literature in that we identify information spillovers that occur even before the initial loan is issued, and are therefore more deleterious to private incentives to expand the credit supply. Also of note, much of this focuses on consumer lending (Castellanos et al. 2018 , Burke et al. 2019 , or microfinance (Agarwal et al. 2018, Karlan and Zinman, Azevedo et al. 2019) , while our focus is on SME lending.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on the consequences of information sharing through credit registries on bank competition and credit supply (eg. Jappelli and Pagano 2002 , Djankov et al. 2007 , Hertzberg et al. 2011 , Liberman 2016 , Dobbie et al. 2016 , Foley et al. 2018 , Sutherland 2018 ). As noted above, our principal contribution to this literature is to document that information spillovers between lenders can also occur through loan approvals rather than loan issuance. Because loan approvals are not encoded in the Peruvian credit registry, our results imply that information spillovers can occur even before information is encoded in the credit registry, and before the initial lender has derived any benefit from screening new borrowers. And our results imply that information spillovers between lenders may occur even in settings without well-functioning credit registries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the context and novel screening technology and our data sources, Section 3 presents our evidence for free riding in loan approvals, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion of possible mechanisms.
Study Context and Data

Study Context
We collaborated with one of the five largest commercial banks in Peru (we refer to this bank as our "partner bank") in an exercise that started in 2012. At the time, our partner bank had only a small SME portfolio. Among commercial banks, our partner bank had only a five percent market share for lending to medium enterprises and a less than one percent market share for lending to micro or small enterprises. Our partner bank was thus particularly interested in reaching the micro and small and medium enterprise segment. This segment was dominated by four other banks, which accounted for 90 percent of commercial bank micro and small enterprise lending. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) also played an important role in the micro and small enterprise credit market.
Forty-four NBFIs had a combined credit volume that was equal to 60 percent of the commercial bank credit volume for small enterprise credit and 2.4 times the commercial bank credit volume for microenterprise credit. 1
To better reach the SME segment, our partner bank piloted a psychometric tool for screening loan applicants, with support from the IDB. The psychometric tool was developed by the Entrepreneurial Finance Lab (EFL), a fintech company founded in 2010, and relies on a series of questions that measure personality traits, skills, knowledge, and attitudes that aim to predict the applicant's ability and willingness to repay a loan. The IDB and EFL co-financed the implementation of the psychometric tool during the pilot with our partner bank.
SMEs that applied for a working capital loan (up to 18 months in duration with an average loan size of $3,855) between March 2012 and August 2013 were screened by the EFL tool as part of the application process. Applicants who achieved a score on the EFL application higher than a threshold defined by our partner bank were automatically offered a loan, while those below the EFL threshold were offered a loan only if they were approved under the institution's conventional screening method. Loan terms were also discontinuously more attractive above the threshold than below.
We note that as our identification strategy relies on comparing borrowers just above and just below an arbitrary EFL score cutoff, the predictive power of the EFL questions is not important for our study. Regardless of EFL predictive power, applicants just above and below the cutoff would have nearly identical predictions of creditworthiness. Critically, however, the borrowers and other lenders could not discern, in all cases, whether borrowers were marginally approved due to their EFL score or if they were approved because our partner bank deemed them creditworthy for substantive reasons. Therefore, both competing lenders and the borrowers themselves may rationally update about the borrowers' creditworthiness after receiving a loan approval from our partner bank.
Data
We obtained data on 1,883 SMEs that applied for a working capital loan with our partner bank, from three sources: administrative data from our partner bank, from EFL, and from Equifax Peru. The administrative data from our partner bank include the EFL score and the date when the SME applied for the loan, as well as the applicant's age, gender, business sales, and whether or not our partner bank approved them for a loan. The applicants in our sample were on average 39 years old and 50 percent of them were female.
Average annual business revenues were about US$12,000 (see Column 1 in Table 1 ). In addition, for each loan applicant, the data include the national ID number (DNI) and, if their business is registered under the business name instead of the individual's name, it also includes the business's tax payer number (RUC). 2 Our second set of data come directly from EFL. For a subset of borrowers who ultimately took loans from our partner bank, EFL recorded loan terms including interest rate, loan duration, and loan size.
Our third data source is Equifax Peru, the largest credit bureau in the country. For the DNIs and RUCs in the EFL data, we purchased five years of monthly information on borrowing from regulated financial institutions, covering the period from May 2011 to April 2016. 3 Equifax collects this information from the Peruvian Bank Supervisor's (SBS) credit registry (Central de Riesgos). SBS collects data directly from all regulated financial institutions monthly, covering the universe of commercial banks, as well as all regulated NBFIs. For each ID number in any given month, we obtained the total amount borrowed (current and delinquent) from each SBS supervised financial institution in Peru, for the three loan types most relevant in our sample: microloans, loans to small firms, loans to medium firms. If a borrower has more than one loan of the same type with the same 2 We originally had 1,909 SMEs in the data. All provided their DNI and 1,327 also provided an RUC. However, for 20 SMEs, the DNIs and RUCs are inconsistent with each other, suggesting typos. We drop these observations from the sample to avoid using wrong information from our second data source. We also drop 6 observations where two DNIs reported the same RUC, that is, three SMEs where two co-owners seem to each have applied for a loan. In these cases, it is not possible to cleanly assign an EFL score to the SME as the unit of observation. Thus, we end up with a sample of 1,883 SMEs. The fraction of the sample dropped is not significantly different below and above the EFL threshold. 3 By law, Equifax is not allowed to provide data that is older than five years. institution, Equifax reports only the sum of these loans, with no information on how many loans constitute this total amount.
Our primary outcome of interest is whether loan applicants took out a new loan in the six months following their application to our partner bank. We measure loan take up for each institution and loan type by creating a dummy equal to one if the amount outstanding of either the DNI or RUC associated with a loan applicant increases by any amount. The immediate post-application period allows six months for loans to be processed and disbursed and provides some time for applicants to potentially shop around with other financial institutions for other loan offers. For a placebo test, we define an analogous outcome measuring whether each loan applicant took out a new loan from each financial institution in the six months immediately preceding his or her loan application with our partner bank.
We also purchased Equifax credit scores for the month when the SME applied for the loan from our partner bank. Here, Equifax included a dummy variable indicating whether this score was primarily based on their credit history, i.e. a "thick file," or on demographics and other sources, such as the Peruvian tax authority (SUNAT), i.e. a "thin file". 4 Our sample includes 1517 thick file borrowers and 366 thin file borrowers.
We utilize two measures of credit market competition: the log of per capita NBFI lending at the district level, and the per capita number of NBFI branches at the district level. We focus on NBFIs as our results indicate that the increase in loans for thin-file applicants comes from NBFIs, not banks. We note that as our partner bank operates in only eight districts, this is a fairly coarse measure of competition. Total NBFI lending for February 2012 was obtained from the Peruvian Bank Supervisor (SBS) and the 2012 population size from the Human Development Index of the UNDP.
Though we do not directly observe the profits that lenders derive from each loan applicant, we compute an imperfect measure of profits from new loans at the applicantinstitution level. If the applicant does not have a new loan with a given financial institution six months after the loan application, profits are defined to be zero. If they have a new loan within six months of the loan application, we measure the size of this loan as the sum of all loan balance increases in the six months. The size is set to zero for applicants with no new loans. We obtain the interest income by multiplying the size of the loan by its "typical" interest rate. Typical interest rates are reported monthly by the SBS for each financial institution and each loan type. We do not observe interest rates at the loan level for the full sample, but anecdotal evidence suggests that interest rates are fairly standardized within products for a given lender. To capture losses, we then subtract the amount in default 24 months after the initial loan application, which could be zero in case of no defaults. We picked 24 months to allow six months for the loans to be issued and 18 months for the termination of loans with the maximum duration. 5 Importantly, our measure of profits also excludes any administrative costs associated with loan issuance and collection. Our regressions using profits as an outcome variable should therefore be interpreted as suggestive.
The EFL Screening Methodology
While an understanding of the precise details of the EFL screening tool is not critical for our identification strategy or results, we include a brief overview in this section.
The EFL screening tool was developed by quantifying the characteristics of borrowers who had defaulted on a past loan versus those who had not, and of borrowers who owned small businesses with high versus low profits. Characteristics are drawn from three categories: personality, intelligence, and integrity (Klinger, Khwaja, and del Carpio, 2013) .
Personality assessments are based on the five-factor or "Big Five" model (Costa and McCrae, 1992) , intelligence assessments are based on digit span recall tests (a component of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale) and the Raven's Progressive Matrices tests (Spearman, 1946) , and the integrity assessment is adapted from Bernardin and Cooke (1993) .
The predictive tool is constantly evolving in response to new data collected by EFL on borrower cash flows and repayment behavior. The version that was used in our study was the "Africa v2 psychometric credit score," and was initially created based on 920 pilot tests in Africa. The most recent version of this tool currently relies on 386,244 tests with loan repayment data, including tests from Latin America, where further refinements have been made according to the local context.
As it turns out, in our sample the EFL score is not a strong predictor of repayment.
This can be seen in Table A11 , which reports regressions of borrower default on their EFL and Equifax scores. Across all specifications, the coefficient on EFL score is small and not statistically significant. This may not be surprising as our data are drawn from the time at which EFL was just beginning its work in Peru-the current EFL screening tool may be much more effective.
For the purpose of our study it is good news that the EFL tool does not predict borrower quality. While our identification relies on comparing borrowers just above and just below the EFL threshold set by our partner bank, one concern is that those with marginally higher EFL scores are stronger borrowers and that this may in part explain our results. The fact that EFL scores do not predict borrower quality should assuage this concern.
3 Results
We now describe our identification strategy and results. As our partner bank applied a strict threshold rule based on the EFL score, across which both the likelihood of loan approval and loan terms vary discontinuously, we apply a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Specifically, letting ! " be the borrower's EFL score, !̅ be the EFL cutoff, % " (1) be the outcome of interest for borrower ) conditional on being above the EFL cutoff and % " (0) be the outcome of interest for borrower ) conditional on being below the EFL cutoff, we estimate +(% " (1) − % " (0)|! " = !̅ ) by approximating lim 2 3 →2̅ 5 +(% " (1)|! " ) − lim 2 3 →2̅ 6 +(% " (0)|! " ) (Hahn et al., 2001) . We estimate the lim 2 3 →2̅ 5 +(% " (1)|! " ) and lim 2 3 →2̅ 6 +(% " (0)|! " ) using a variety of bandwidths around !̅ and polynomial functions of various orders.
In our main results we estimate a linear model on either side of the threshold.
Normalizing the threshold !̅ = 0, and letting 7 " represent the observed outcome variable for person ), we estimate 7 " = 8 + :;(! " ≥ 0) + = > ;(! " < 0)! " + = @ ;(! " ≥ 0)! " + AB " + C "
where ;(⋅) is the indicator function and B " is a vector of control variables representing age, gender, log business revenues, and Equifax score. Estimates from models with higher order polynomials are included in the appendix. The estimation is done in Stata using the command rdrobust, described in Calonico et al. (2014a) . Following the prescription of those authors, we report the standard RD coefficient but robust confidence intervals and pvalues, as each of these are asymptotically mean-squared-error optimal.
At the outset, in Table 1 we note that none of the demographic or business characteristics are discontinuous across the EFL threshold. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the RD estimates for the full sample, thick file borrowers, and thin file borrowers, and across all characteristics none exhibit a statistically significant jump at the RD cutoff. Online
Appendix Table A1 present analogous specifications with higher order polynomials. This offers some reassurance in our research design. Figure A1 plots distribution of EFL scores in our sample and allows for visual inspection that the distribution appears continuous across the threshold. A formal test using the Stata command rddensity (Cattaneo et al., 2018) confirms we cannot reject that there is no sorting around the EFL threshold.
The "First Stage"
Our primary outcomes of interest are the probability of loan approval from our partner bank and whether the applicant ultimately takes a loan from our partner bank, one of its competitors, or neither. Because there is reason to believe that the magnitude of free riding in loan approvals may differ for loan applicants with thick files and those with thin files, we separately estimate the effects of being above the EFL threshold on the full sample, and on each of the two subsamples.
We now establish our first stage; borrowers just above the EFL threshold are more likely to be approved for loans by our partner bank, and loan terms are discontinuously more attractive above the EFL threshold. The first row of Table 2 presents our estimates of the effect of being above the EFL threshold on the likelihood an applicant is to be approved for a loan offer from our partner bank. Every point estimate in Table 2 corresponds to the coefficient of interest, :, in a separate RD model. The first row of Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the corresponding data and fitted models. All the estimates in Table   2 are from linear models and the associated optimal bandwidth. Alternate specifications with different polynomials and controls are presented in Online Appendix Tables A2 and   A3 .
The first row of Table 2 demonstrates that across all borrowers in our sample, those who are just above the EFL threshold were 23 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: 14 -32) more likely to be approved for a loan by our partner bank, those with thick files were 25 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: 15 -34) more likely to be approved for a loan, and those with a thin files were 10 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: -4 -25) more likely to be approved for a loan. These estimates reflect that most applicants who scored below the EFL threshold were approved for a loan as well.
Appendix Table A12 presents evidence that borrowers immediately above the EFL threshold received more attractive loan offers from our partner bank than those immediately below the threshold. Specifically, using data from EFL on loan terms for a subset of the borrowers who ultimately took loans from our partner bank, we estimate the RD model where the outcomes are interest rates, loan size, and loan duration. Our estimates indicate that borrowers above the EFL threshold who accept loans from our partner organization receive loans with 4.7 month longer durations (robust 95% confidence interval: 0.83 -10.48). Further, our estimates suggest that loans to borrowers above the threshold are larger and have lower interest rates, though our estimates are not significant at traditional levels.
Because the decision of whether or not to accept a loan is endogenous to loan terms, borrowers above and below the EFL threshold who choose to accept loans are not directly comparable. This makes the magnitudes of our estimates difficult to interpret.
Nevertheless, we find that those above the EFL threshold who ultimately borrow receive better terms than those below the EFL threshold who ultimately borrow. It is straight forward to show that this implies that loan offers for applicants above the EFL threshold have more favorable terms than loan offers to those below the EFL threshold. 6
Further, the second row of Table 2 indicates that across the whole sample of applicants, those just above the EFL threshold were nearly three times as likely to accept a loan as those just below the EFL cutoff (15.6 percent of borrowers below the EFL threshold accepted a loan from our partner bank, whereas those just above the threshold are estimated to accept a loan at a rate of 15.6 + 27.6 = 43.2 percent). In contrast being above the threshold corresponds to 23 percentage point increase-reflecting an increase of only 29 percent-in the likelihood of loan approval. That additional loan approvals cannot account for most of the additional borrowing above the threshold indicates that loan offers were discontinuously more attractive at the threshold. The results are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to thick and thin file borrowers.
Main Results
Rows 2 through 5 of Table 2 present our main results-thin file applicants just above the EFL threshold are not only more likely to borrow from our partner bank but also from our partner bank's competitors. Because the EFL score was only observed by our partner bank, these estimates reflect the (direct or indirect) competitor response to the approval and loan terms of our partner bank. The bottom two rows of Figure 1 provide a graphical depiction of the data and fitted models and alternate specifications with higher order polynomials and different controls are presented in Online Appendix Tables A2 and   A3 .
The second row of Table 2 establishes that across all borrowers in our sample, those just above the threshold are 28 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: 13 -46) more likely to receive a loan from our partner bank in the six months following their application. When looking at the full sample of borrowers, the additional likelihood that they borrow from a competing lender during the same window is small and not statistically significant. The estimates are qualitatively similar for thick file borrowers.
For thin file borrowers the patterns differ markedly. The additional likelihood that a thin file applicant just above the threshold borrows from our partner bank within six months following their application is only 13 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: -12 -36) and not statistically significant. However, thin file borrowers just above the EFL threshold are 33 percentage points (robust 95% confidence interval: -5 -75) more likely to borrow from competing financial institutions. Taking the point estimates literally, comparing Rows 2 and 3 suggests that nearly three quarters of the new loans from thin file borrowers are issued by competing lenders. Rows 4 and 5 of Table 2 demonstrate that this effect is highly concentrated amongst non-bank financial institutions rather than traditional banks. Therefore, for borrowers without established credit histories, much of the benefit derived from our partner bank applying the EFL screening technology accrued to competing financial institutions who responded to our partner bank's loan approvals with approvals of their own. For borrowers with established credit histories, competing financial institutions do not make significantly more loans as a result of the loan approval of our partner bank, as might be expected since both borrowers and competitors have other information to assess credit worthiness.
While the conclusions of Table 2 are confirmed in the graphical plots in Figure 1 , there is a notable additional pattern across several of the plots. To the right of the EFL cutoff, there is a downward slope in the probability of borrowing from our partner bank (for the full sample and for thick file borrowers), and in the probability of borrowing from competing financial institutions (for thin file borrowers). This pattern may be due to the fact that the EFL score is correlated with the size and profitability of a borrower's business and may therefore also be correlated with her alternatives to borrowing from commercial lenders. Applicants with higher EFL scores may be less likely to borrow because they have superior alternatives, such as trade credit and financing investment through retained earnings. Nevertheless, for the full sample and for thick file borrowers there is a clear discontinuity at the threshold in the likelihood of borrowing from our partner bank, and similarly for thin file borrowers with competing financial institutions, providing a visual confirmation of the estimates in Table 2 .
In Table 3 we present results from our primary placebo test: estimates of the same RD model but for the outcome of borrowing any time in the six months preceding loan application from our partner bank. As in Table 2 , every point estimate in Table 3 corresponds to the coefficient of interest, :, in a separate RD model. As expected, the RD estimates for the full sample, for thick file borrowers, and for thin file borrowers are small and not statistically significant. Alternate specifications are presented in Online Appendix
Tables A4 and A5.
Heterogeneity by Level of Competition
Bolstering the evidence for free riding, in Table 4 we focus on thin file applicants and demonstrate that the free riding effects are stronger in regions where our partner bank faces more competition. Note that in contrast to Tables 2 and 3, each column in Table 4 represents estimates from a separate model. We explore heterogeneous treatment effects based on log NBFI credit per capita in each locality in which our partner bank has a branch.
The coefficient of interest is on the interaction between the degree of our partner bank branch level competition and the discontinuity around the EFL threshold. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate a negative and statistically significant relationship between the degree of competition facing our partner bank and the additional probability of a thin file applicant borrowing from our partner bank if they exceed the threshold. The estimates
in Column 2 imply that increasing the level of competition by one standard deviation would correspond to an additional 9.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood a thin file applicant took a loan from our partner bank as a result of being marginally over the threshold.
The pattern for borrowing from competing financial institutions is reversed, albeit less precisely estimated. The estimates in Column 3 through 6 demonstrate a positive, though not statistically significant relationship between the degree of competition facing our partner bank and the probability of a thin file applicant borrowing from a competing lender around the threshold. Table A6 presents results from our alternative measure of competition, log NBFI branches per capita. The results are qualitatively similar. Table 5 presents the effects on our partner bank's and on competing lenders' profits, measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Note that profits for our partner bank and its competitors vary across the threshold due to 1) the differential likelihood that borrowers are approved for a loan, and 2) the differential likelihood that they accept loans from each lender. Further, recall that, as discussed in Section 2.2 we have only an imperfect measure of profits. Thus, this analysis should be taken as suggestive.
Lender Profits and Default
Column 4 demonstrates that thick file borrowers just above the cutoff are on average 242% (robust 95% confidence interval: 123 -389) more profitable for our partner bank than those just below the cutoff. On the other hand, estimates of our partner bank's additional profits from thin file borrowers are much smaller and not statistically significant.
But for NBFIs, Column 8 demonstrates that thin file borrowers just above the threshold are 301% (robust 95% confidence interval: 15 -636) more profitable than those just below the threshold. Therefore, most of the additional profits resulting from screening new thin file borrowers accrued to competing financial institutions. Alternate specifications are presented in Online Appendix Tables A7 and A8 . Table 6 presents estimates of the effect of the EFL threshold on the resulting defaulted balances for borrowers at our partner bank and its competitors. We find no evidence that marginally approved applicants that took loans from our partner bank were differentially reliable from those who took loans from competing financial institutions.
Alternate specifications are presented in Online Appendix Tables A9 and A10 .
Discussion
In a pilot subsidized by the IDB, our partner bank in Peru adopted a novel screening technology in an effort to expand its loan portfolio among SME borrowers. While our partner bank succeeded in expanding financial inclusion, our estimates suggest that for borrowers without a pre-existing credit history, many of the new loans originated from competing financial institutions. As our partner bank followed a threshold rule whereby applicants who scored above a cutoff were automatically approved for a loan and those who scored below it were not, we can exploit exogenous variation in loan approvals;
because competing financial institutions could not see the underlying scores, their additional likelihood to approve borrowers above the score threshold is a result of the loan approval of our partner bank.
A number of auxiliary tests bolster the credibility of our identification strategy and results. We note that no observable demographic or business characteristics are discontinuous at the threshold. A placebo test examining the likelihood to borrow from any financial institution in the six months prior to applying for a loan from our partner bank shows no discontinuity in the threshold. We demonstrate free riding effects for borrowers without prior borrowing histories but not for those with prior borrowing histories, as would be expected if competing lenders and the borrowers themselves already have strong signals to infer the credit worthiness of borrowers in the latter group. Finally, we show that the free riding effects are stronger in areas where our partner bank faces more competition from non-bank financial institutions.
This phenomenon greatly reduced the benefit accruing to our partner bank of their efforts to expand financial inclusion. Indeed, after the pilot and subsidies ended, our partner bank decided not to continue using the EFL screening technology. We argued in the introduction that this phenomenon may justify subsidies for efforts to extend loans to new borrowers, including the adoption of novel screening technologies.
We have labeled this competition effect "free riding in loan approvals," as competing lenders benefitted from our partner bank's investment to expand its credit supply. This free riding may operate through several channels. On the supply-side, competing lenders may have responded directly to the loan approvals of our partner bank, if borrowers shared our partner bank's loan approval as evidence of their credit worthiness.
On the demand-side, borrowers who were approved for a loan from our partner bank may have updated about their own credit worthiness and engaged in more vigorous search for alternative sources of credit. In that case competing financial institutions would be responding only indirectly to the loan offers of our partner bank. We view this mechanism as inconsistent with the fact that we find no effects on borrowers with an established credit history, who would presumably be similarly emboldened. But we note the borrowers with established credit histories who are approved as a result of surpassing the screening threshold are those who could not receive a loan on the basis of their credit history alone. Thus, it is possible that they did redouble their efforts to find an alternative source of credit but that these efforts were fruitless. This interpretation is consistent with the results of Karlan and Zinman (2009) who find that borrowers randomly selected to receive a loan updated their perceptions about their own credit worthiness.
On the supply-side, we can rule out mechanisms in which information spillovers occur through the credit registry as loan approvals are not recorded in the Peruvian credit registry. And on the demand side we can rule out that increased demand for loans from competitors was driven by increased loans from our partner bank and complementarities in demand for credit. Of all thin file borrowers to the right of the EFL threshold in the bandwidth of our primary specification, only a quarter of those who took loans from competing lenders also took a loan from our partner bank.
While we cannot pin down a single mechanism, we note that the consequences of each of these are largely the same. In either case the additional loans resulting from our partner's efforts to expand financial inclusion were primarily issued by other financial institutions. Whether this was a direct response to the loan approvals of our partner bank, or merely an indirect consequence, the justification for subsidizing the expansion of financial inclusion remains.
Figure 1: Probability of Loan Approval and Increased Borrowing from Partner and Competing Banks
Notes: The plots were generated using the "rdplot" Stata command developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b) for a bandwidth of 20 around the EFL score threshold with a global polynomial of order one and 95 percent confidence intervals for each bin. The probability of a new loan is measured by a dummy variable =1 if the amount outstanding of either the DNI or RUC associated with a loan applicant from a given financial institution increases by any amount number in the six months following their application to our partner bank. Notes: This table shows background characteristics of all loan applicants at the time of applying for a loan with our partner bank. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations of all applicants (Column 1), thick-file applicants only (Column 3) and thin-file applicants only (Column 5). Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) 107 Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of loan approval and the probability of having a new loan in the first six months after the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values. 133 Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of having a new loan six months before the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values. 107 Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the profits of financial institutions from granting loans to applicants in the first six months after the loan application. Profits are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values. 172 Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the defaulted amount of applicants 24 months after the loan application. Each Row X Column represents the coefficient of interest from a seperate regression. Defaulted amounts are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
Table 6. Amount in default from loans granted six months after loan application
All applicants
Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Figure A1 : Histogram of EFL Score (Normalized)
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of the EFL scores for the 1883 loan applicants in our sample. We normalized the EFL scores to zero at the threshold set by our partner institution. All applicants with EFL scores above zero were offered a loan. Table A2 . Loan offer and take-up six months after loan application (local polynomial of order 2)
All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of loan approval and the probability of having a new loan in the first six months after the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations of all applicants (Column 1), thick-file applicants only (Column 3) and thin-file applicants only (Column 5). Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 2 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) Table A3 . Loan offer and take-up six months after loan application (without additional controls)
All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of loan approval and the probability of having a new loan in the first six months after the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variable the date when the applicant took the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the biasadjusted p-values.
(1) Table A4 . Pre-application loan take-up (placebo test, local polynomial of order 2)
All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of having a new loan six months before the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 2. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 2 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the probability of having a new loan six months before the loan application. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variable the date when the applicant took the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table A7 . Profits from loans granted six months after loan application (local polynomial of order 2) All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the profits of financial institutions from granting loans to applicants in the first six months after the loan application. Profits are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 2. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 2 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the profits of financial institutions from granting loans to applicants in the first six months after the loan application. Profits are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variable the date when the applicant took the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the biasadjusted p-values.
(1) Table A9 . Amount in default from loans granted six months after loan application (local polynomial of order 2)
All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the defaulted amount of applicants 24 months after the loan application. Each Row X Column represents the coefficient of interest from a seperate regression. Defaulted amounts are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 2. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 2 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variables the date when the applicant took the EFL tool as well as the loan applicant's age, gender, business revenues (in logs) and Equifax score at the time of the EFL tool. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) Table A10 . Amount in default from loans granted six months after loan application (without additional controls)
All applicants Thick-file applicants Thin-file applicants Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the defaulted amount of applicants 24 months after the loan application. Each Row X Column represents the coefficient of interest from a seperate regression. Defaulted amounts are set to zero for applicants with no new loans with a financial institution, and are measured using the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) function. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants (Column 2), thick-file applicants only (Column 4) and thin-file applicants only (Column 6). The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variable the date when the applicant took the EFL tool. Robust biascorrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 122 Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on the terms of loans obtained from our partner bank. Column 1 shows the mean, standard deviation and number of observations below the cutoff within the optimal bandwidth calculated for the polynomial order 1. Column 2 shows the regression discontinuity impact estimates for the effect of the EFL tool on each variable using the Stata rdrobust command of local polynomial order 1 for all applicants. Interest rates are measured as percentages, duration is measured in months and loan size corresponds to the log of the loan amount granted. The bandwidth, and therefore the number of observations, is optimally selected by the command. All regressions include as control variable the date when the applicant took the EFL tool. Regressions in Column 2 also control for age, gender, log revenues and Equifax score of the applicant at the time of the application. Robust bias-corrected p-values (in parentheses) and number of observations are reported below each coefficient. Following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) , we report the conventional coefficients and the bias-adjusted p-values. 
